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Abstract: All preceding studies that investigate the consequences of "defense news" shocks (like 
war or terrorism) on military spending assumed a permanent deviation from its growth path. 
Using 25 years of military spending annual data for more than hundred high, middle and low 
countries (based on the definitions of income levels suggested by the World Bank), this paper 
provide new evidence on the effect of exogenous shocks on military spending. By employing 
more powerful panel unit root tests that accounts for both cross-sectional dependence across 
countries and structural breaks, we find robust evidence supporting the stationarity of military 
spending for all the panels (full, high, middle and low income countries) highlighting that any 
exogenous shock to military spending has a temporary effect, meaning that military spending 
will return to its time trend. The stationary characteristic of military spending is fundamental for 
forecasting defence budget in response to exogenous shocks (terrorism and military conflicts). 
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1. Introduction 
Influenced by the seminal work of Benoit (1973, 1978), a large number of defense 
economics literature emerged to investigate the link between economic growth and military 
spending in both developed and developing countries (Ram 1995, Sandler and Hartley 1995, 
Devarajan et al. 1996, Chang et al. 2011, d'Agostino et al. 2011, Shahbaz et al. 2013a, b, c, 
Tiwari and Shahbaz 2013, Chen et al. 2014, Chang et al. 2015, Lau et al. 2015). The impact of 
military spending on external debt is a topic that has received wider attention lately (See for 
example Brzoska 1983, Alami 2002, Dunne et al. 2004, Günlük-Senesen 2004, Perlo-Freeman et 
al. 2004, Smyth and Narayan 2009, Wolde-Rufael 2009, Alexander and Robert 2013, Shahbaz et 
al. 2014, Zhang et al. 2016). However, the empirical findings of the impact of military spending 
on economic growth and external debt are rather inconclusive and therefore are not beneficial to 
policy makers to construct a comprehensive defense and economic policy at the global level.  
However, a rapidly changing environment of globalization induced international conflicts 
among countries and thus the understanding of unit root properties of military spending is 
important on several grounds. If military spending is found to be stationary at level, then any 
shock1 affecting military spending will not have a long-lasting effect over time. As such, the 
governments’ fiscal policies will not be effective as the military spending will return to its actual 
equilibrium. On the contrary, if any shock affecting military spending contains a unit root 
indicating the non-stationary behavior, policy making will be effective in the presence of 
permanent shocks.   
The classical school of thoughts contends that military spending has negative effect on 
the macro-economy and may increase federal indebtedness due to war spending. The raises in 
fiscal deficit crowds-out private (capital) investment, which not only reduces net productive 
capital stock but also lowers domestic production. Military spending occurs at the cost of 
development spending may increase unemployment. It may reduce domestic production by 
lowering export potential of an economy and hence exports volume in international market 
(Dunne et al. 2008). Military spending influences economic growth negatively through the 
crowding-out effects on public and private investments (Sandler and Hartley, 1995).On the 
contrary, the Keynesian school of thought believes the potential role of aggregate demand in 
stimulating military spending via generation of output and employment for a nation (Gold 1990, 
Chan 1995).Furthermore, military spending raises human quality via spending money on 
education, research and technical trainings (Adam and Gold, 1987). This has positive spill-over 
effects in an economy (Dunne and Tian, 2015). Finally, military spending also promotes 
investment climate via maintaining stability and gears towards creating new business in the 
economy with collaboration of foreign investors (Heo, 2010).  
Due to the enormous importance for a nation, it is crucial to study whether countries 
should increase or decrease military spending. Figure-1 reveals that the estimated military 
spending was $US1600 billion in 1988, which increased to $US 1756 billion in 20122. It is noted 
that growth of military spending over the period is 9.75%. This military spending corresponds to 
2.5% of world GDP (gross domestic product). Figure-2 shows that world military spending 
increased significantly in the last decade due to rapid increase in military spending in USA for 
her involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The USA spends 39% of world military spending in 
                                                          
1Military spending shocks are defined by a spending growth above the trend that is accompanied by expectations 
about future military conflicts. 
2It is the highest military spending after World War II. 
2012 and China spends 9.5%, Russia spends 5.2%, UK spends 3.5%, Japan amounts to 3.4%, 
next 10 countries consume21.2% and the rest of world spend 18.2% of global military spending, 
respectively. Due to global financial and economic crisis during 2008-09, many countries 
reduced their public spending but surprisingly, continued to increase military spending till 2011-
12.China and India continue to increase military spending due to their rapid economic 
growth.3The behaviour of regional spending over the time period of 1988-2012 can be seen in 
Figure-3. Figure-3 shows that military spending of US has been higher during 1988-2012 in 
comparison to the rest of region’s military spending in the world.  
 
Figure-1: World Military Spending (1988-2012) 
 
 
Figure-2: Global Distribution of Military Spending in 2012 
 
 
Figure-3: Regional Military Spending (1988-2012) 
                                                          
3Tiwari and Shahbaz, (2013) noted that economic growth adds in military spending in India and it is also consistent 
with the findings of Ali and Dimitraki (2014) for the Chinese economy. 
 
 
In light of the above context, the objective of the paper is to investigate whether the 
fluctuations in military spending are transitory or permanent across high, middle and low income 
economies. If the series (military spending) is stationary, then fluctuations to military spending 
return to an asymmetric path and will have no effect on aggregate demand, employment 
generation and economic growth. Military spending will be ineffective to stimulate domestic 
economy in the long run. As such, the government must rely on short-run economic policies 
regarding military spending. On the other hand, if the series contains a unit root then fluctuations 
in military spending are permanent. The series may show consistency, stability and path 
dependence. The path dependence in military spending indicates that any change in military 
spending will have permanent effect on economic growth via labor and goods markets. Military 
spending may also have pass through effect on other factors such as physical capitalization, 
development spending, trade, internal and external debts, and human development etc. 
Therefore, it is vital to know for researchers and policy makers whether shocks affecting military 
spending are temporary or permanent within full and sub-panels framework.  
The forecasts in military spending also play an important role in designing economic 
policies. The reliable forecasts enable policy makers to allocate funds for military spending to 
attain sustainable economic growth in the long run. The past behaviour is suitable for forecasts if 
the series contains a stationary process. On the contrary, if the series contains a unit root process 
then past behaviour of military spending is no more used for future forecasts. It becomes difficult 
for policy advisors to forecast the exact influencing behaviour of military spending on economic 
growth. Therefore, it is very important to know for researchers, policy advisers and fiscal 
governments of all sampled countries whether shocks affecting military spending are transitory 
or permanent for modelling purpose. A unit root in military spending indicates that factors 
affecting the series have permanent effect on it and vice-versa. Finally, the presence of stochastic 
process in military spending is an indication of persistence behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-1: Brief Literature Review 
No. Autours  Time Period Unit Root Tests Conclusion  
1 Kollias, (1997) 1954-1993 ADF, KPSS, Transitory 
2 Chang et al. (2001) 1952-1995 ADF, KPSS, ZA Transitory 
3 Dunne et al. (2001) 1960-1996 DF, ADF Permanent 
4 Dunne and Nikolaidou, (2001) 1960-1996 DF Permanent 
5 Sezgin, (2001) 1956-1994 ADF Permanent 
6 Al-Yousif, (2002) 1975-1998 ADF, PP Permanent  
7 Karagol and Palaz, (2004) 1955-2000 ADF Permanent 
8 Kalyoncu and Yucel, (2006) 1956-2003 ADF Permanent 
9 Lee and Chen, (2007) 1988-2003 LLC, IPS, Hadri Permanent 
10 Karagianni and Pempetzoglu, (2009) 1949-2004 ADF Permanent 
11 Wijeweera and Webb, (2009) 1976-2007 ADF Transitory 
12 Abu‐qarn, (2010) 1988-2004 ADF Permanent 
13 Dicle and Dicle, (2010) 1975-2004 ADF, N-P, ZA Permanent 
14 Pradhan, (2010) 1988-2007 IPS, LLC, ADF, PP Permanent 
15 Shahbaz and Shabbir, (2012) 1971-2009 N-P  Permanent 
16 Eryigit et al. (2012) 1950-2005 LS Permanent 
17 Shahbaz et al. (2013a) 1972-2008 N-P Permanent  
18 Alexander (2013) 1988-2009 LLC, IPS Transitory 
19 Tiwari andShahbaz(2013) 1971-2010 ZA Permanent  
20 Ali and Dimitraki, (2014) 1953-2008 DF-GLS Transitory 
21 Farzanegan, (2014) 1959-2007 ADF, PP Transitory 
22 Yilgör et al. (2014) 1980-2007 SURADF, CADF Transitory 
23 Topcu and Aras, (2015) 1973-2010 ADF, PP, ZA Permanent  
24 Chang et al. (2015) 1988-2010 LLC, IPS, MW Permanent 
25 Lau et al. (2015) 1952-2007 NCADF Mixed 
26 Zhang et al. (2016) 1997-2012 LLC, IPS, Hadri Permanent 
27 Huang et al. (2016) 1996-2014 LLC, IPS Transitory 
28 Jalil et al. (2016) 1960-2-13 ADF, PP Transitory 
29 Manamperi, (2016) 1970-2013 ZA Permanent 
Note: Lee and Strazicich (2001, 2013), nonlinear cross-sectional augmented Dickey–Fuller. DF, ADF, KPSS, ZA, 
PP, LCC, IPS, N-P, LS, DF-GLS, SURADF, CADF, MW and NCADF stand for Dickey-Fuller, Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller, Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin, Zivot-Andrews, Philips-Perron, Levin-Lin-Chu, Im-Pesaran-
Shin, Ng-Perron, Lee-Strazicich, DF-Generalized Least Square, Seemingly-Unrelated-Regression ADF, Cross-
Sectional ADF, Maddala-Wu and Nonlinear Cross-Sectional ADF. 
 
Though non-stationary property of energy consumption has been addressed substantially 
in the field of resource and energy economics over the past decade (Narayan and Singh 2007, 
Narayan et al. 2008, Smyth 2013, Lean and Smyth 2014, Shahbaz et al. 2013a, b, Dogan 2016), 
but an empirical investigation on unit root properties of military spending was not addressed 
widely in defense spending literature. This implies that examining unit root properties of military 
spending across different income groups has far from settled in the field of defense economics 
literature. In addition, a limited number of studies are available in the literature investigating the 
unit root properties of military spending using time series and panel non-stationary techniques 
(Table-1). 31% of the studies conclude that fluctuations in military spending are transitory while 
3% of the studies present mixed results. 66% of the studies show that shocks in military spending 
are permanent. This ambiguity in empirical findings provides rationale for researchers to move 
further for consistent and reliable empirical evidence for all sampled countries.   
Influenced by the research gap, our study appears to be the first one which 
comprehensively examines the non-stationary property of military spending using the large panel 
data of 104 high, middle and low income countries over the period of 1988-2012. This study 
contributes to the existing literature of peace and defence economics in several ways. First, we 
perform a series of panel unit root tests accommodating both cross-sectional dependence and 
structural breaks arising in the series. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study to do that. 
The underlying motivation of our study is to capture cross-sectional dependence and structural 
breaks in the series. It appears to be unavoidable due to growing competition and various 
endogenous and exogenous shocks affecting military spending in the real world.4Second, we also 
employ multiple panel unit root tests to produce consistency and robustness results of military 
spending under full and sub-panels investigation based on the recent views of Karanfil (2009)5 
and Smyth (2013)6 in the field of energy policy and applied energy. We, therefore, believe that 
our study will provide deeper understanding of the effect of military spending to the generalist 
audiences and technical readers. Overall, this is the contribution of our study emerging from 
doing unit root properties of defense spending and also helping each and every country to 
implement standardized defense policy for the minimization of conflicts with each other in the 
long-run.    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses econometric 
methodology used for empirical panel estimation. Section 3 analyses the data description. 
Section 4 summarizes the discussion of empirical results. Section 5 deals with the discussion of 
conclusion and policy implications. 
 
2. Econometric methodology 
 
2.1 The Second-Generation of Panel Non-Stationary Tests 
We applied Moon and Perron (hereafter MP, 2004), Pesaran (2007) and Choi (2001, 
2002) tests. The presence of unit root (in across sectionally dependent panel) can be tested by 
applying the factor model (MP, 2004) MP (2004). The MP model supposes the presence of 
common factor in the error terms: 
 
, , 1 ,(1 )i t i i i i t i ty y            (1) 
 
                                                          
4Zhang et al. (2016) pointed out that cross-sectional dependence among countries play an important role in affecting 
the series because different countries have different public and private investment, varying economic and political 
development, heterogeneous social and cultural backgrounds along different security system. In addition, structural 
breaks play a vital role in affecting series because different economies have been affected due to various internal and 
external policy shocks over the time. In the presence of cross-country panel investigations, if we do not account for 
these concerns jointly, then it may lead to misleading results and limiting deeper analysis.  
 
5Karanfil (2009) argued that policy advisers give much importance to the robustness and consistency results rather 
than time periods and econometrics techniques used in the study. This implies that both robustness and consistency 
results can be obtained via using multiple panel unit root tests.  
6Smyth (2013) also advices the use of multiple panel non-stationary techniques to enable the results reliable and 
consistent. 
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where tF is a )1( K vector of commons factors, i is the coefficients vector corresponding 
to the common factors and 
ti, is an idiosyncratic error term. Moon and Perron, (2004) proposed 
to test the null hypothesis i =1 for Ni ....,,1 against the heterogeneous alternative hypothesis 
1:1 iH  for some i. To do so, the author suggested the following steps: firstly, MP proposed to 
estimate the first order autoregressive coefficient by using a pooled ordinary least square (OLS). 
Secondly, they used principal component analysis to construct another estimator for the error 
terms from the specific one of the first step. Finally, they eliminated the common factor by 
projecting the original data onto orthogonal space data (de-factoring the data). MP (2004) 
suggested using the following two t-statistics:  
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In order to eliminate the cross-sectional correlations and removing deterministic trends, 
Choi (2002) proposed to transform the following series by eliminating the individual and time 
effects: 
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As a result, the author performed the unit root test on the new orthogonalized variable. 
Choi (2002) proposed to combine the p-value ip of the Dickey-Fuller unit root t-statistics in each 
cross-sectional unit and employing the following three statistics: 
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where  is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. 
 
Pesaran, (2007) extended the IPS test structure by adding an unobserved common factor 
tf and an individual specific factor i : 
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where
ti,  ),0(
2iid and )( 4,tiE  . As suggested by Pesaran (2007), the presence of 
unit root can be tested by using the cross-sectional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF)statistics: 
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Given that cross-sectionally Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic for i is denoted by
),( TNti , Pesaran proposed a panel root t-statistic called the Cross Sectional Augmented IPS: 
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2.2 The Third-Generation of Panel Non-Stationary Tests 
We applied panel unit root test with structural breaks to check for the robustness of the 
unit root test results. We used the Lagrange Multiplier (LM)-based unit-root test proposed by Im 
et al. (2005). The ILS test is based on Lee and Strazicich’s model: 
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where ,
ˆ
xi t t tS y Z     for (t = 2,…T) and tZ  is a vector of exogenous variables 
defined by the data generating process;   is the vector of coefficients in the regression of  ty  
on tZ  respectively with  the difference operator; and 1 1x y Z   , with 1y  and 1Z  the first 
observations of ty  and tZ  respectively. In order to test the null hypothesis 0i , the authors 
constructed the panel LM test statistic from the t-statistic, *
it , of each individual unit root: 
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They suggested sub-sequently the following standardized panel LM test statistic: 
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)(tE and )(tV  are tabulated by Im, Lee and Tieslau (2005). 
 
3. Data Description 
The data for military spending (constant 2005 US$) across high, middle and low income 
economies is collected from World Development Indicators (CD-ROM, 2014). The classification 
of countries into high income, middle income and low income economies is also followed by the 
World Bank’s website. We use total population series to convert military spending data into per 
capita units. The data on military spending per capita (US$) is transformed into natural-log. The 
study uses the annual time period of 1988-2012. 
 
4. Results Discussions 
On the other hand, we applied the panel non-stationary techniques to investigate the 
existence of temporary or permanent shocks affecting military spending in a panel of 104 
economies, followed by a sub-panel analysis for 36-high income countries, 52-middle income 
countries, and16-low income countries. We begin by applying the cross sectional dependence 
tests (Pesaran’s (2004), Friedman’s (1937) and Frees (1995) tests). The results are displayed in 
Table-2. We found that null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence is rejected for most 
panels. Next, we employed “the first and the second generation of panel non-stationary tests” for 
the four panels. The results are reported in Table-3. The tests provide evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that military spending contains a unit root for the four panels (entire panel of 104 
countries including high, middle and low income countries). Our analysis, therefore, indicated 
that the battery of panel unit root tests show stationarity across all panels. This finding was 
corroborated by the results of LM panel unit root test which allow for structural breaks. The Im, 
Lee and Tieslau, (2005) test rejects the hypothesis of non-stationary process for entire panel of 
104 countries; high, middle and low income countries (Table-4). Overall the panel non-stationary 
tests without and with structural breaks provide evidence of stationary process for all panels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table-2: Test of Cross-Sectional Dependence Analysis 
Cross dependence test Sampled Panel Data Classifications 
 Full Panel High Low Middle 
Frees’ test of cross sectional 
independence (p-value) 
30.25 
(0.00) 
1.60 
(0.00) 
1.38 
(0.00) 
3.73 
(0.00) 
Pesaran’s test of cross sectional 
independence (p-value) 
77.29 
(0.00) 
5.72 
(0.00) 
-3.83 
(0.01) 
1.18 
(0.29) 
Friedman’s test of cross sectional 
independence (p-value) 
695.91 
(0.00) 
86.53 
(0.00) 
11.97 
(0.07) 
40.74 
(0.01) 
 
Table-3: Panel Data Non-Stationary Analysis7 
Second-Generation Panel Non-Stationary Tests: Full Sampled Countries Panel 
Types of test statistic Test statistic 1 % CV 5 % CV 10 % CV 
Moon Perron1 statistic (ta_bar statistic) -34.702 -2.326 -1.645 -1.282 
Moon Perron2 statistic (tb_bar statistic) -12.649 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Pesaran test, (2007) statistic -1.904 -2.727 -2.608 -2.545 
Choi test statistic (Pm) 8.658 2.327 1.645 1.282 
Choi test statistic (Z) -5.762 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Choi test statistic (Lstar) -5.999 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Second-Generation Panel Non-Stationary Tests: High Income Countries Panel 
Moon Perron1 statistic (ta_bar statistic) -25.136 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Moon Perron2 statistic (tb_bar statistic) -7.851 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Pesaran test, (2007)  -1.889 -2.875 -2.715 -2.630 
Choi test statistic (Pm) 2.358 2.327 1.645 1.282 
Choi test statistic (Z) -2.162 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Choi test statistic (Lstar) -2.130 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Second-Generation Panel Non-Stationary Tests: Low Income Countries Panel 
Moon Perron1 statistic (ta_bar statistic) -7.196 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Moon Perron2 statistic (tb_bar statistic) -4.269 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Pesaran test, (2007)  -1.566 -3.071 -2.836 -2.727 
Choi test statistic (Pm) 5.514 2.327 1.645 1.282 
Choi test statistic (Z) -4.023 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Choi test statistic (Lstar) -4.385 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Second-Generation Panel Non-StationaryTests: Middle Income Countries Panel 
Moon Perron1 statistic (ta_bar statistic) -28.264 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Moon Perron2 statistic (tb_bar statistic) -12.117 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
Pesaran test, (2007)  -1.743 -2.934 -2.754 -2.668 
Choi test statistic (Pm) 8.889 2.327 1.645 1.282 
Choi test statistic (Z) -5.784 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
                                                          
7The Matlab codes used for estimating Panel non-stationary tests are available on Christophe Hurlin’s homepage 
(http://www.univ-orleans.fr/deg/masters/ESA/CH/churlin_R.htm )  
Choi test statistic (Lstar) -6.161 -2.327 -1.645 -1.282 
 
Table-4: Panel Non-Stationary Techniqueswith Accommodating Structural Breaks (Im et al. 2005)8 
Panel Classifications Without break Single break Double breaks 
Full Panel -29.604*** -84.348*** -110.928*** 
High Income Panel -15.724*** -43.715*** -55.986*** 
Middle Income Panel -18.094*** -62.252*** -80.755*** 
Low income Panel 0.208 -29.499*** -36.901*** 
Note: The critical values for panel LM non-stationary tests with structural breaks are-2.326,-1.645 and -1.282 at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Since the pioneering work of Benoit (1973, 1978) on the nexus between defense spending 
and economic growth, a large number of studies emerged to verify the stationary property of 
military spending within time series and panel frameworks. A majority of these studies fails to 
reject non-stationarity in the series. The results of the previous studies could be biased, 
inconsistent and inconclusive due to their failure to account for cross-sectional dependence 
among countries and structural breaks arising from data series and may lead to incorrect policy 
measures. We accommodate both cross sectional dependence and structural breaks in the series 
for our stationarity tests and thus correct for the biases. Therefore, our study made a humble 
effort to contribute to the research gap in the existing defence economics literature. We have 
deployed the battery ofpanel stationarity tests which incorporate cross-sectional dependence 
among countries and structural breaks arising in the series to examine the unit root proprieties of 
military spending variable of 104 high, middle and low income countries from 1988 till 
2012.Our findings strongly reject the existence of a unit root in military spending, thus lending 
firm support to the existence of income groups-wise stationarity for our panel of countries. 
 
In terms of empirical findings, we conclude that any shock to military spending has a 
temporary impact for full, high, middle and low income countries, suggesting mean reverting 
rather than following random walk behaviour over the time. More intuitively, this suggests that 
any endogenous and exogenous shocks affecting military spending in these countries will be 
temporary in nature. Given this consistent findings, it is possible for us to suggest a common 
policy theme for policy makers and fiscal governments of high, middle and low income countries 
of the world. On policy front, the study, therefore, suggests that the policy makers in high, 
middle and low income countries should not design or re-design any adverse long-term policies 
of military spending which is expected to have negative effects on crucial national and 
international security, peace and stability as both endogenous and exogenous shocks affecting 
military spending are not long-lived. In doing so, it is also believed to have damaging impacts on 
internal and international migration, labour employment, investments and sustainable economic 
growth and development. It is also not effective for fiscal governments of high, middle and low 
income countries to use military spending as a tool to protect the internal and external stability as 
the series is stationary. Another implication of the findings is that policy makers can use past 
                                                          
8The Gauss codes used for estimating the Im, Lee and Tieslau (2005) panel non-stationary test is available on Junsoo 
Lee's homepage (http://old.cba.ua.edu/~jlee/gauss). 
 
behaviour of military spending to forecast future military spending. In addition, the researchers 
can use stationary military spending series in level form and there is no need for them to go for 
differencing the spending series for model predictions. Finally, we leave for further studies to 
investigate the integration properties of military spending separately for high, middle and low 
income countries coming under the four geopolitical panels (Africa, Europe, Middle East & 
South Asia, and Pacific Rim). Though for now, this research gap is beyond the scope of our 
analysis.  
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